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vengeance) in the former case. In clear contrast to 
the strict prohibition of direct ‘ontological’ issues in 
cultural studies, the proponents of the Third Culture 
unabashedly approach the most fundamental pre-
Kantian metaphysical issues such as the ultimate 
constituents of reality, time, space, the origins and 
the end of the universe, what consciousness is, how 
life emerged, and so on.
PoPoMo Correlationism
The struggle has recently been rekindled with the 
so-called Speculative Turn triggered by Quentin 
Meillassoux’s After Finitude (2006).4 It is also worth 
pointing out that we have by now drifted out of 
all-too-structuralist postmodernity. In the words of 
Claire Colebrook: ‘It is [the] equivocity that engen-
ders postmodernism, for it establishes the signifier, 
system, subject on the one hand, and the real or the 
retroactively constituted world on the other.’5 What 
binds an otherwise heterogeneous group of Specu-
lative Realists is their shared antipathy for so-called 
correlationism.6 A correlationist accepts that we 
only ever have access to the correlation between 
thinking and being – epistemology and ontology 
– and never to either of the terms in isolation.7 In 
other words, correlationism marks a self-reflexive 
loop (marked by finitude) where nothing can be 
independent of thought. The familiar flavour of 
cognitive suspension or plain agnosticism vis-à-vis 
the ‘outside’ (noumenon) is shared by most post-
Kantians.8 Kant, himself a ‘weak correlationist’, did 
in fact allow for the possibility of the ‘in-itself’ albeit 
unknowable.9 But if the idea of the world independ-
PoMo Relativism
Slavoj Žižek’s diagnosis of the struggle for intel-
lectual hegemony between postmodern (PoMo) 
Cultural Studies and the cognitivist popularisers of 
‘hard’ sciences is still relevant, a decade on.1 The 
so-called Third Culture covers a vast range of theo-
ries: from evolutionary theory to quantum physics 
and cosmology, cognitive sciences, neurology, 
theory of chaos and complexity, studies of the cogni-
tive and general social impact of digitalization of 
everyday life, to auto-poetic systems.2 The theorists 
and scientists involved have been endeavouring 
to develop a universal formal notion of self-organ-
izing emergent systems. These systems apply to 
‘natural’ living organisms and species, as well as 
social ‘organisms’ such as markets and other large 
groups of interacting social agents.3 On the other 
hand, there are cultural theorists whose pseudo-
radical stance against ‘power’ or ‘hegemonic 
discourse’ effectively involves the gradual disap-
pearance of direct and actual political engagements 
outside the narrow confines of academia, as well 
as the increasing self-enclosure in an elitist jargon 
that precludes the very possibility of functioning as 
an intellectual engaged in public debates. So, the 
choice, according to Žižek, comes down to either 
dealing with an all-too-fast or metaphoric transpo-
sition of certain biological-evolutionist concepts to 
the study of the history of human civilization, or – in 
the case of cultural studies – sharing the stance of 
cognitive suspension, characteristic of postmod-
ern relativism. But as Žižek concludes, ‘prohibited’ 
ontological issues seem to have returned (with a 
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a straw person. As Charles T. Wolfe cautions: ‘The 
trick is to not go all the way with embodiment, so 
as not to end up in what Deleuze, speaking of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, called the “mysticism of the 
flesh”.’12 However, as far as the discipline of archi-
tecture is concerned, this otherwise healthy dose 
of scepticism is not only utterly premature but also 
counterproductive, and quite literally so. Somewhat 
paradoxically, architecture has historically under-
gone a gradual disassociation from the material 
realm and become an ultimate white-collar profes-
sion. The consequent withdrawal from reality (‘into 
itself’) has been seen either as (bad) escapism 
or as a (good) strategy of resistance: ‘The with-
drawal is into an idealist realm, a realm secluded 
from everyday life and from contamination by the 
unacceptable new order.’13 The urge to ward off 
the givens and to continue to contemplate alterna-
tives is most worthy. Especially in the light of the 
recent tendency to jump on the band wagon of ¥€$ 
(is more) ‘pragmatic yet utopian [sic] third way’.14 
Architects seem desperate in their effort to catch 
up with the media. The non-normative has become 
the norm, writes Terry Eagleton.15 Michael Hays, 
the spearhead of critical theory in architecture, 
laments how the most theoretically aware contem-
porary architects have unfortunately rejected what 
he sees as the most important operative concept 
of the theory of architecture at the moment of its 
re-foundation in the 1970s, namely autonomy.16 But 
idealist bracketing also comes at a price. Architects 
might end up painting themselves into a corner of 
impotence by depriving themselves of the means 
to intervene which, after all, has always been the 
main trait of (any) materialism.17 As Eugene Holland 
admits: ‘Any postmodern Marxism worthy of the 
name will want to abandon teleology and adopt 
contingency and emergence as better paradigms 
for understanding history.’18 This is how architects 
Reiser and Umemoto proclaim the new materialist 
position: 
ent of our access seems unintelligible, as another 
speculative realist Ray Brassier cautions, perhaps 
the fault lies more with our notion of intelligibility 
than with the world:
The phenomenological radicalization of transcenden-
talism, initiated by Heidegger, found itself excavating 
deeper and deeper into the ‘primordial’ (…) uncover-
ing the conditions for the conditions of the conditions. 
Yet, the deeper it digs towards the pre-originary the 
more impoverished its resources become and the 
greater its remove from things themselves. Heidegger 
and his successors end up striving for the pre-reflexive 
through increasingly reflexive means; exacerbating 
abstraction until it becomes reduced to (…) playing 
its own exuberant vacuity. This meta-transcendental 
problematic reaches some sort of apogee in Derrida 
who introduces both a healthy measure of scepti-
cism and a fatal dose of irony into the proceedings by 
revealing how the immediacy of access was always 
already contaminated by mediation or différance. (…) 
Once the problematic of access and of the access 
to access has reached its ironic dénouement in this 
terminally self-enclosed spiral of reflexivity it is no 
surprise to see the very notion of a world indifferent to 
our access to it dismissed as unintelligible. Phenom-
enology begins with the things themselves, and ends 
up poring over words, nothing but words. Perhaps, this 
is inevitable dénouement of the philosophy of access 
[correlationism].10
Realism
Denying realism amounts to megalomania, accord-
ing to Karl Popper. But we need to bear in mind 
that not so long ago a Realist ‘coming out’ and 
embracing a mind-independent reality would be 
met with ridicule. It would have been considered, 
at the very least, as naive. Still, the (new) material-
ism in general, and the (empiricist) Affective Turn 
in particular, seem to be gaining momentum to 
such an extent that even some of the scholars of 
this affiliation urge caution.11 As it happens, many 
a logocentric thinker has been unjustly turned into 
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the appearance of essence, nor about the condi-
tions of apparition. Rather, it is about the mutual 
presupposition of the virtual – the modality with 
the real-yet-not-actual ontological status – and the 
actual, where the virtual would be utterly sterile 
without the actual.25 The reciprocity of the two is 
crucial, as the cultural studies scholar Lawrence 
Grossberg explains in a recent interview:
The distinction between possibility and virtuality is 
crucial, and I think that most theories of imagination 
have been theories of possibility. Of which, the utopian 
is the most obvious example. The result has been a 
politics that is almost never rooted in the present. But 
I think one must look to the present because it is in 
the present that you find the virtual, that you find the 
contingency. (…) I think it is rooted in the possibility (if 
one can use that word) of reconceiving the imagina-
tion as intimately connected with the analytics of the 
empirical. Imagination is not separate from science, 
analysis, or description of the actual. Imagination has 
to be rethought as a rediscovering of the contingent, 
the virtual in the actual (…) and that it seems to me is 
a very different notion of the imagination than what the 
Left has ever had.26
The world, after all, ‘does not exist outside of its 
expression.’27 Deleuze and Guattari were explicit 
about this often misunderstood maxim. Transcend-
ence is always a product of immanence. One could 
argue that ‘reification’ is necessary for the expres-
sion to start ‘migrating’, a major precondition for the 
creation of an artistic style.28 It has become some-
what common for their epigones to favour the virtual 
over its expression.29 But the fact of the matter is 
that you cannot have one without the other. Expres-
sion is not the meaning but the torsion of both the 
expressor and the expressed. If ‘non-organic vitality’ 
is the content, argues Zourabichvili, then expression 
is its ‘agrammatical syntax’.30 Their determination is 
absolutely reciprocal. In any event, it is useless to 
seek a more substantial truth behind the phantasm 
(essence of appearance). Furthermore, seeking 
We assert the primacy of material and formal specifi-
city over myth and interpretation. In fact, while all myth 
and interpretation derives from the immediacy of mate-
rial phenomena, this equation is not reversible. When 
you try to make fact out of myth language only begets 
more language, with architecture assuming the role of 
illustration or allegory. This is true not only of the initial 
condition of architecture but actually plays out during 
the design process in a similar way. Material practice 
is the shift from asking ‘what does this mean?’ to ‘what 
does this do?’19 [emphasis added]
We cannot afford to throw out the baby or toolkit 
with the bathwater of ideology ‘precisely because it 
is not a matter of ideology, but of a machination’.20 
The best strategy of resistance seems to lie not in 
opposition but in (strategic) affirmation. To embrace 
naturalism is to see cognition as belonging to the 
same world as that of its ‘objects’.21 There is no 
need to postulate the existence of a more funda-
mental realm (transcendental ‘skyhooks’). Natura 
naturans (naturing nature/creator) and natura natur-
ata (natured nature/created) are inseparable. There 
is no ultimate foundation, but the immanence of 
powers, relations and bodily compositions: ‘Power 
is not homogeneous, but can be defined only by 
the particular points through which it passes.’22 The 
first step to break out of the pernicious self-reflexive 
loop is to acknowledge that – with or without us – 
matter does matter. This is what Charles Sanders 
Peirce refers to as ‘firstness’. Then there are rela-
tions or ‘secondness’. Crudely put, the dyad marks 
the difference between the (intrinsic) properties 
and (extrinsic) capacities. Lastly, there is also the 
‘centre of indetermination’ or ‘thirdness’ where an 
interval between perception and action is inserted 
(the mind). It is crucial not to dismiss the ‘pedagogy 
of the senses’, where secondness presupposes 
firstness, and thirdness incorporates both first-
ness and secondness.23 This is another way of 
saying that everything starts with the sensible or, 
as Whitehead’s disciple Susanne K. Langer put it: 
‘All thinking begins with seeing.’24 It is neither about 
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tive is to exclude – once and for all – the law of 
the excluded middle. We need to get rid of this 
Ockhamite tendency because not all the poten-
tialities are an already accrued value. In this way 
architecture will be able to reclaim the medium 
specificity from a genuine realist/materialist posi-
tion and be treated rightfully as a non-discursive 
practice.36 This will certainly not be easy as the 
hegemonic binary system knows no such logic. Its 
inherent dualism brings together the most unlikely of 
allies: the Cartesians and Informationists (ex-Cyber-
netics).37 Regrettably, the media theorist Friedrich 
Kittler is right to credit the father of the informa-
tion theory Claude Shannon with writing the most 
influential master thesis ever.38 By Kittler’s account, 
Shannon even ‘thought digitally’, which is plausible 
and, for that, all the more dangerous, just as any 
other approach that distinguishes between meaning 
and information. Opposing ‘the static Aristotelian 
duality’ of Form and Matter with the ‘meta-theoretical 
trinity’ of Processing (executing commands), Trans-
mitting (requiring an address) and Storing (memory 
as data base) is not helpful.39 The analogy between 
needing an address to retrieve computer data and 
an address to locate a house in a city (or even to 
recall memories) is as popular as it is misleading. It 
all seems to boil down to the following ‘dilemma’, as 
posited by Gibson:
The issue between the two kinds of theory [primacy of 
language vs. primacy of perception] can be illustrated 
by the following question. Does a child distinguish 
between two physically different things only after he 
has learned to make different responses to each, 
names, for example; or does he first learn to distin-
guish them and then (sometimes) attach names? On 
the former alternative he must learn to respond to 
things; on the latter he must learn to respond to the 
difference. (…) The issue is deep and far-reaching.40 
[emphasis added]
such a truth via a confused sign leads to mere 
symptomatologizing.31 It is equally futile to contain 
the truth within stable figures (sense of apparition): 
‘To construct solid cores of convergence where we 
might include, on the basis of their identical prop-
erties, all its angles, flashes, membranes, and 
vapors.’32 Hence there is no possibility of phenom-
enalization either because every form, conversely, 
is a compound of the relationship between forces. 
This is how Michel Foucault sees Deleuze’s coun-
tereffectuating strategy as a way of overcoming 
both ‘bad habits’, namely, symptomatologizing and 
phenomenalization:
Phantasms [incorporeal events] do not extend organ-
isms into the imaginary; they topologize the materiality 
of the body. They should consequently be freed from 
the restrictions we impose upon them, freed from the 
dilemmas of truth and falsehood and of being and 
nonbeing (the essential difference between simu-
lacrum and copy carried to its logical conclusion); they 
must be allowed to conduct their dance, to act out their 
mime, as ‘extrabeings’.33
Traditionally, the truth was defined as adequation 
and noncontradiction but as we will argue, both 
claims can be challenged from the perspective of 
a genealogical method. If there is no referent, the 
former loses all meaning, while the requirement 
for the latter is shown to depend on the illusion of 
the potential mastery of a wholly self-transparent 
discourse, namely, phenomenology.34
Non-Discursive
A lot of lip service has been paid to bridging the gap 
between theory and practice but the true impera-
tive should be to stop regarding trans-disciplinarity, 
with its nomadic structure, and disciplinary specifi-
city as mutually exclusive. It should not come as a 
surprise that some of the most prominent beacons 
of contemporary architectural theory are happily 
‘trespassing’.35 What binds them is zero degree 
tolerance for narrow-mindedness. Another impera-
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therefore, be either correct or incorrect.49 The 
ecological approach to perception knows no such 
thing as ‘sense data’. Ecological, it must be quali-
fied, stands for reciprocity between the life-form and 
its environment.50 Their mutual relation is not one 
of computing but of resonance. It is no coincidence 
that the School of Ecological Perception describes 
perceiving as tuning in – as in radio frequency – 
as opposed to the computational metaphor (with 
the brain as a computer, eye as a camera, and so 
on).51 Perception cannot be considered independ-
ently of the environment since it is defined as an 
evolved adaptive and constructive relation between 
the organism and the environment. Unfortunately, 
experimental psychology research has relied 
overwhelmingly on object perception, rather than 
environment perception, with the findings of the 
former providing the basis for understanding the 
latter.52 Architecture continues to suffer from this 
fallacy. Arguably the greatest feat of contemporary 
psychology has been to include the environment of 
life-forms in the study of the psyche.53 To separate 
the ‘cultural’ from the ‘natural’ environment – as if 
there were a world of mental and a world of mate-
rial products – is a fatal mistake. There is only one 
world.54 Only recently have biologists considered 
the (feed-back/feed-forward) effect of the ‘niche 
construction’ on the inheritance system.55 The theory 
of niche-construction proposes that an organism 
does not passively submit to the pressures of a pre-
existing environment, but that it actively constructs 
its niche (genetically, epigenetically, behaviourally 
and symbolically). Implications for the discipline of 
architecture are obvious: perception is an impor-
tant area of study because it provides information 
about the environment which is in turn intimately 
related to the life of life forms. Architecture ought 
to reclaim its vanguard position within the Epige-
netic Turn, which embraces technology in general 
terms (tekhne) as constitutive of humanity, and 
not merely the other way around.56 It is high time 
to complement the passive principle of natural 
selection (logical argument) with the active princi-
Ecosophy
Indeed, what motivates the author’s research is the 
architect’s habit of taking for granted the homol-
ogy between representation and ‘presentation’. 
There is widespread consensus on this fallacy 
among laymen and professionals alike. As Robin 
Evans diagnosed: ‘We are landed not only with a 
picture theory of vision, but with a pervasive picture 
method of construction for manufactured objects 
as well.’41 We are also landed with the hypothesis 
of the five senses, the proof of Aristotle’s enduring 
authority. The number five relates to the supposed 
channels of sensation running from the periphery 
to the centre. In the case of vision, the sequence 
is all-too-familiar: Object > Retinal Image > Image 
in the Brain > Various Operations on the Sensory 
Image > Full Consciousness of the Object and its 
Meaning.42 Such an approach to perception – as the 
conscious experience of sensory input – remains 
in its essence Aristotelian through and through. 
Philosopher of mind Susan Hurley named the 
implicit model of the mind behind such an approach 
as the ‘classical sandwich’, with perception as input, 
action as output, and cognition as in-between.43 We 
see with our eyes, don’t we? No, Gibson was reso-
lute, we see with saccading eyes in the mobile head 
on the locomotive body supported by the ground, 
the brain being only the central organ of an entire 
visual system.44 According to Gibson, the brain 
may produce sensations, hallucinations, dreams, 
illusions and after-images, but never perceptions. 
You are not your brain.45 The perceptual system is 
synaesthetic, that is, cross-modal and supported 
by proprioception, which refers to the body’s ability 
to sense movement within joints and their posi-
tion. It is therefore also kinaesthetic and, as such, 
inseparable from action.46 Kinaesthesia is not like 
something, explains proponent of the Corporeal 
Turn Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, it is what it is.47 
Neither thingness, nor essentiality.48 Seeing is a 
matter of skill and participation, and not contempla-
tion. Perception and action are not propositions, 
nor are they based on a proposition and cannot, 
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It is time for the discipline to awaken from the slumber 
of anthropocentrism and shake off the baggage of 
old dualisms. Deleuze and Guattari propose that we 
drop anthropomorphism for geomorphism, which 
defies (all-too-human) interpretation.64 In the same 
vein, Keith Ansell-Pearson calls for a major recon-
figuration of ethology: ‘Behaviour can no longer be 
localised in individuals conceived as preformed 
homunculi, but has to be treated epigenetically as 
a function of complex network systems which cut 
across individuals and which traverse phyletic line-
ages and organismic boundaries.’65 Relation comes 
before that which it places in relation.66 In Heideg-
gerian parlance, it is dwelling that precedes both 
building and abstract or subjective thought.67 In 
contrast to binary logic, one should always proceed 
from the middle or the milieu, both conceptually and 
literally.68 As explained by philosopher of science 
Isabelle Stengers, Deleuze deliberately plays on the 
double meaning of this French term, which stands 
for the middle and the surrounding.69 Proceeding 
from the middle is arguably the best way to undo 
the habit of thinking in terms of formal essences 
and sensible formed things. As philosopher Gilbert 
Simondon was well aware, the tradition tends to 
forget a sort of middle, an intermediary. And it is at 
the level of this intermediary that everything gets 
done.70
 The complementarity between the animal and 
its environment was a life-long project of psychol-
ogist James Jerome Gibson. His (unwitting) 
affiliation with Deleuze and contribution to radical 
empiricism in general is still underappreciated.71 
The most notable point of convergence between 
the two thinkers is their more or less overt theory 
of ‘passive synthesis’, with which they vehemently 
oppose, or better yet complement, the active 
synthesis of representation.72 Passive syntheses 
fall outside of the jurisdiction of an ego whereby a 
living present is a multiplicity of ‘contemplations’.73 
Deleuze describes passive synthesis as one which 
‘is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the 
ple of self organization (natural argument).57 The 
principle of exteriorization – the city as an exoskel-
eton is a good example – is evolution continued by 
other means. This is beautifully illustrated in the 
opening scene of 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) 
by Stanley Kubrick, compressing 4.4 million years 
of tool evolution from the bone to the spaceship.58 
The epigenetic structure of inheritance and trans-
mission is, as the very term suggests, external and 
non-biological. As such it transcends our particular 
existence. It extends beyond our biological finitude. 
Moreover, as Guattari claims: ‘Man and the tool 
are already components of a machine constituted 
by a full body [socius] acting as an engineering 
agency, and by men and tools that are engineered 
(machinés) insofar as they are distributed on this 
body.’59 [emphasis in the original] The long-lasting 
legacy of privileging episteme over tekhne needs 
to be rethought, as the philosopher of technol-
ogy Bernard Stiegler urges.60 The ‘what’ (tekhne) 
invents the ‘who’ (the human) at the same time that 
it is invented by it. Strictly speaking, architecture, as 
a sedimented epi-genetic (mnemonic) device, has 
an even higher order of autonomy, which makes it 
epi-phylo-genetic.61 If epigenetics is the concept of 
non-genetic heritability (such as language acquisi-
tion), then epiphylogenetic means that the rhetoric 
of ‘We Build our Cities and in Return They Build Us’ 
is to be taken literally.62 Stiegler explains:
Epiphylogenetics, a recapitulating, dynamic and 
morphogenetic (phylogenetic) accumulation of indi-
vidual experience (epi), designates the appearance 
of a new relation between the organism and its envi-
ronment, which is also a new state of matter. If the 
individual is organic organized matter, then its relation 
to its environment (to matter in general, organic or 
inorganic), when it is a question of a who, is mediated 
by the organized but inorganic matter of the organon, 
the tool with its instructive role (its role qua instru-
ment), the what. It is in this sense that the what invents 
the who just as much as it is invented by it.63
135
representation.
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